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Abstract
This study links voter-centred and interest group perspectives to assess the role structurally powerful businesses can play in
contested political issues. Revisiting the literature on business influence in politics, incumbent businesses are theorised to
strategically use their structural power to influence voters’ preferences. The conceptual framework is illustratedwith a case
study of a direct democratic vote related to Swiss energy policy. To empirically trace the role incumbent businesses played
in the run-up to the vote, the study employs a two-step approach. First, it uses discourse network analysis (DNA) to exam-
ine arguments and actor coalitions in the public debate preceding the vote. Second, the DNA results inform a statistical
analysis of survey data on voting behaviour. The findings suggest that incumbent businesses can use their structural power
strategically to shape voting behaviour. The study stimulates the discussion about political power relationships in societies
and enriches the nascent debate about phasing out unsustainable energy infrastructure. Importantly, it opens up ways to
combine DNA with other methods, an avenue that shows promise for use and further refinement in future applications.
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1. Introduction
In 2016, Swiss voters had the opportunity to stop the
domestic use of nuclear power. Fuelled by the 2011
Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan, the Green Party of
Switzerland had launched a popular initiative to phase
out this technology for electricity generation. The initia-
tive provided for a gradual process of power plant clo-
sures, with the last plant to be retired by 2029. Home
to the oldest nuclear power fleet in the world, the
Swiss population had formerly rejected a number of sim-
ilar popular initiatives at the ballot between 1984 and
2003. Given the sustained and vocal opposition to nu-
clear power among parts of the population, observers
viewed the Fukushima disaster as the proverbial last
drop needed to make the bucket overflow, in the sense
of initiating a fundamental rethink of Swiss energy policy
(also in view of the substantial changes in energy policy
that Switzerland’s neighbouring countries Germany, Italy,
and even France enacted after Fukushima). However,
while polling found that a robust majority supported the
popular initiative until six to eight weeks before the vote,
the proposition was finally rejected by 54.2 percent of
voters. How can this outcome be explained?
The politics of energy technology phase-outs have
recently become a topic of interest for academic re-
searchers (Leipprand & Flachsland, 2018; Normann,
2019; Rosenbloom, 2018; Schreurs, 2013), as demands
for phasing out energy assets that produce public ‘bads’
(such as nuclear waste or carbon dioxide emissions) are
currently being articulated in many countries. Retiring
such legacy assets might be desirable from a societal
point of view, but the process comes along with con-
centrated losses that are mainly incurred by a relatively
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small number of actors (e.g., electric utilities and min-
ing companies) who have benefited from previous pol-
icy choices. Therefore, these actors have a strong incen-
tive to politically organise themselves to avert change.
To organise their opposition, the expected losers of en-
ergy system changes often join forces (Kim, Urpelainen,
& Yang, 2016). In addition, they tend to rely on trade
associations, peak organisations, and other political ac-
tors to influence public discourses and decisions (Barley,
2010). With respect to nuclear power, it is known that
business interest groups are making considerable effort
to influence public preferences and discourses (Gilbert,
Sovacool, Johnstone, & Stirling, 2017; Shrader-Frechette,
2011). However, little is known about the actual effects
these activities have on people’s perceptions and prefer-
ences. The controversy around the popular initiative to
phase out nuclear power in Switzerland provides an op-
portunity for the systematic study of the arguments em-
ployed by both proponents and opponents of a nuclear
phase-out in public discourse, and for exploring how the
formermay impact voters’ decisions concerningwhether
to support such a proposal at the ballot box.
Conceptually, the study is anchored in broader de-
bates about the role of business influence in politics.
As Lindblom (1977) famously argued, incumbent busi-
nesses, based on their control over important economic
resources, enjoy a ‘privileged position’ in the political sys-
tem. The state’s dependence on private sector profitabil-
ity often allows businesses to influence political decisions.
This structural power typically comes with resource ad-
vantages and privileged access to decision-makers, am-
plifying business influence in policymaking (Newell &
Paterson, 1998). While this perspective is helpful for un-
derstanding how businesses and business interest groups
can shape political outcomes in arenas shielded from
voter influence, it has less to say about business influence
in noisy politics. Noisy politics refers to situations of high
salience in which the preferences of attentive voters are
important signposts for policymakers. Importantly, voters’
initial preferences in these situations might run counter
to business interests. Are businesses able to sway voters’
preferences in situations of noisy politics? If so, how?
In asking these questions, the study takes up
Culpepper’s (2016, p. 460) call for “returning the voting
public to [the] inquiry into political conflict between in-
terest groups.” While the behavioural political science
literature has produced a vast body of work on the
sources and effects of citizen preferences and voting
behaviour, organised interests and the concept of busi-
ness power are underrepresented in these accounts
(Hacker & Pierson, 2010, p. 167). Further, althoughmuch
research assumes that vested interests are an impor-
tant driver of voter preferences, few studies have un-
derpinned this link empirically (Dür, 2018). As a con-
tribution to bridging this gap, this investigation follows
Emmenegger and Marx’s (2019) suggestion of integrat-
ing behaviouralist and interest group perspectives and
studying politics as an ‘organised spectacle.’ It thereby
specifically focuses on the role of political discourse in
which political actors exchange (and contest) their ar-
guments, and explores the extent to which citizens’ ap-
proval of prominent arguments raised by political actors
relates to their voting behaviour.
2. Business Power and Preference Formation
2.1. Business Power and Noisy Politics
Lindblom (1977) argued that, compared to other po-
litical elites, business enjoys a ‘privileged position’ in
politics. Businesses command financial and human re-
sources and crucial knowledge that they can employ to
convert their interests into political influence. Asmore re-
cent research has shown, businesses have a particularly
strong influence on public policies in situations of ‘quiet
politics.’ Quiet politics refers to issues with little public
scrutiny and low sustained interest from the voting pub-
lic (Culpepper, 2016, p. 461). If the public does not func-
tion as a veto player, businesses can work through covert
channels of influence and do not need to take partisan
political incentives into account (Culpepper, 2011).
But what happens if policy issues become salient?
Consider climate change, or the gender pay gap: While
voters in many places have been largely indifferent to
these issues over sustained periods of time, allowing
businesses to dictate public policies (or the absence
thereof), these issues have recently been elevated on
political and media agendas. In such situations of high
salience business interests are less likely to become di-
rectly converted into policy as policymakers have to at-
tend to voters’ preferences as well. This makes voters’
preferences an obvious—albeit not the only—target of
the political activities of businesses.
To understand the ways in which businesses may try
to sway voters’ preferences, the distinction between in-
strumental and structural power is helpful (Culpepper
& Reinke, 2014; Lindblom, 1977). Instrumental power
is based on a number of strategies that businesses em-
ploy to influence the public, such as public relations cam-
paigns or donations. Influence is less strongly assumed
to be a result of persuasion, but rather to depend on the
amount of resources that are deployed (Emmenegger &
Marx, 2019, p. 107).While research on the influence of fi-
nancial resources in electoral politics abounds, evidence
concerning the conjecture that ‘money buys politics’ is
inconsistent at best (Walker & Rea, 2014, p. 286).
However, some businesses also wield a structural
form of power, a fact which has received far less at-
tention in the electoral literature. A firm’s structural
power is the result solely of its position in the econ-
omy (Culpepper, 2016, p. 459). Structural power is as-
sumed to constrain policymakers’ room for manoeu-
vre automatically, because policymakers that aim at re-
election need to be attentive to the impacts their poli-
cies have on short-term economic prosperity (Przeworski
& Wallerstein, 1988). Firms, according to this perspec-
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages 286–297 287
tive, influence political decisions “whether they want to
or not” because their “sheer existence…leaves them no
alternative” (Bachrach, 1967, p. 80). Recently, though,
the deterministic drive of the structural power argument
has been criticised (Bell & Hindmoor, 2014; Culpepper,
2016). Especially in situations of noisy politics, structural
power requires agency to become converted into policy.
The reason for this is that many voters (unlike politicians)
are likely to be uninformed about business preferences.
In policy debates, businesses can therefore be expected
to actively argue for their preferred courses of action.
However, rather than using arguments that reflect their
narrow self-interest, businesses may strategically signal
what adverse effects may be expected if their prefer-
ences are not converted into policy. Such signals may be
most effective when they imply tangible threats that are
directly relevant to voters. Some of these argumentsmay
be expected to resonate especially well with the popula-
tion. As an example, Emmenegger andMarx (2019) show
how the arguments of businesses against an inheritance
tax proposal in Switzerland focused on the potentially
negative effects that such a tax could have on competi-
tiveness and jobs. Leaving aside whether such concerns
were justified, whatmatters in such situations are voters’
beliefs, and these are socially constructed (Emmenegger
& Marx, 2019, p. 107). This view of structural power as-
signs a strong role for agency by recognizing that the for-
mer can be deliberately used by businesses as a strategic
resource (Culpepper & Reinke, 2014). In this sense, struc-
tural power in noisy politics becomes effective only if it
is aligned with discursive strategies (Levy & Egan, 2003).
2.2. Amplification of Power through Business–Party
Alliances
Experimental research shows that the ability of organ-
ised interests to affect voters’ preferences can be very
limited (Nicholson, 2011). The reason is that voters pre-
dominantly attend to arguments they perceive as cred-
ible, and the perceived credibility of an argument, in
turn, depends on the communicator’s trustworthiness
(Page, Shapiro, & Dempsey, 1987; Rinscheid, Pianta, &
Weber, in press)—an asset that is not necessarily one of
the strengths of ‘big business.’ Hence, to successfully af-
fect voters’ preferences in noisy politics, businesses need
strong and trustworthy allies to communicate their argu-
ments. They typically find these allies in government and
political parties and may take advantage of the fact that
voters often use information about parties’ positions as
a simplifying heuristic when forming preferences about
specific political issues (Kriesi, 2005). In noisy politics,
businesses’ structural power can thus be expected to be
amplified through political parties.
2.3. Preference Formation
In contrast to mainstream assumptions, most individuals
do not have clear-cut preferences with respect to most
issues (Weber & Johnson, 2009). Instead, they “carry
around in their heads a mix of more or less consistent
‘considerations’” (Zaller & Feldman, 1992, p. 585). While
some of these considerations can be congruent, others
may be mutually conflicting. For instance, in the context
of environmental protection, voters might consider per-
sonal freedom, job security in polluting industries, and
the state of the natural environment as relevant con-
siderations. When facing a choice situation (e.g., a di-
rect democratic vote), voters have to assign weights to
these considerations to come to a decision. This is a com-
plex task, highlighting that citizens’ preferences are not
predetermined by exogenous interests (Emmenegger &
Marx, 2019). Importantly, political actors, including busi-
ness interest groups that have an interest in shaping vot-
ers’ preferences, can strategically (re)frame an issue or
emphasise specific arguments so as to raise the accessi-
bility and perceived appropriateness of specific consider-
ations (Chong & Druckman, 2007). Preference construc-
tion in noisy politics is hence an ‘organised spectacle’ in
which citizens respond to the frames and cues they re-
ceive from political elites (Emmenegger & Marx, 2019).
To study the arguments that structurally powerful
businesses employ to influence citizens’ preferences
regarding public policies, a case study involving a di-
rect democratic vote in Switzerland is employed. Direct
democratic votes, which are typically preceded by con-
tested political campaigns, can provide a highly instruc-
tive setting for the study of noisy politics.
3. The Case of Swiss Nuclear Power Politics
The use of nuclear power has been a salient topic in
Switzerland since the 1970s. While left-wing and green
parties, environmental organisations and ‘green’ busi-
nesses (e.g., firms that invest in renewable energies)
favour a nuclear-free energy system, incumbent busi-
nesses from the energy sector and beyond, industry as-
sociations, and centre-right parties have been support-
ive of nuclear power (Fischer, 2015). This constellation
mirrors the stable line-up of two opposing political coali-
tions that spans environmental and energy policymaking
in Switzerland as a whole (Kriesi & Jegen, 2000; Markard,
Suter, & Ingold, 2016). Big electric utilities are structurally
powerful not only because they provide jobs, invest, and
pay taxes, but also due to their role as providers of criti-
cal infrastructure and electricity as a basic public service.
It is worth pointing out that not all businesses are struc-
turally powerful, though. The structural power of incum-
bent businesses like utilities that operate nuclear power
plants differs significantly from that of newer firms that
rely on more recently developed technological and busi-
ness model innovations. In keeping with the conventions
of the literature, I refer to business’s structural power
when in fact it would be more precise to talk about the
structural power of incumbent businesses.
Triggered by the Fukushima crisis, the Green Party
launched a popular initiative in 2011 which proposed
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to restrict the lifetime of nuclear reactors to 45 years.
The proposal implied retirement of three of the five ex-
isting reactors in 2017, and the remaining ones in 2024
and 2029. In line with the polarised political constel-
lation, and as is typically the case with popular initia-
tives, political parties, interest groups, businesses, and
organisations representing civil society engaged in fer-
vent competition to influence public views about the
ballot proposition. The proposal was finally rejected by
54.2 percent of voters that participated in the November
2016 ballot. The rejection of a ballot proposition is not
surprising per se, but the latter outcome is puzzling be-
cause studies that assessed public opinion about nuclear
power after Fukushima consistently showed that a ma-
jority of Swiss citizens were opposed to the technology
(Kristiansen, Bonfadelli, & Kovic, 2016; Siegrist, Sütterlin,
& Keller, 2014; Visschers & Siegrist, 2013; WIN-Gallup
International, 2011) and were in favour of phasing out
nuclear power, precisely according to the plan proposed
by the Green Party (Swiss Electoral Studies 2015, 2017,
p. 119). Even six to eightweeks before the vote, the ballot
proposition was supported by almost 60 percent of the
electorate (Gfs.bern, 2016).While observers of Swiss pol-
itics may rightly identify this development as a recurring
pattern with popular initiatives, this pattern-matching
provides no explanation for the outcome. I contend that
any explanation of the collective preference shift needs
to take the role of business power into account.
3.1. Empirical Expectations
Based on the conceptual priors discussed in Section 2,
three expectations can be derived that guide the em-
pirical analysis. First, during the referendum campaign
incumbent businesses publicly express concern about
the potentially negative effects of the proposed nuclear
phase-out. Instead of pointing to their own foregone in-
come, the concerns raised by structurally powerful busi-
nesses should entail threats of direct relevance to voters.
Second, these businesses line up with political parties to
overcome the problem of limited credibility and amplify
their arguments in the news media, which represent the
main arena for information transmission in direct demo-
cratic campaigns. Third, as a manifestation of business’s
structural power in the form of voting behaviour, the
most salient arguments put forward by incumbent busi-
nesses and parties are predictors of voters’ choices. By
empirically investigating each of the three steps, the em-
pirical analysis helpswith understanding the failure of the
Swiss nuclear phase-out proposal and stimulates discus-
sion about business’s ability to shape public perceptions.
4. Empirical Analysis
4.1. Levels of Analysis
Conceptually integrating interest group arguments with
a behaviouralist perspective on citizen preferences im-
plies that the empirical investigation needs to be atten-
tive to different levels of analysis. The first and second
steps focus on the political debate between supporters
and opponents of the phase-out policy as it unfolded
in the media arena. To assess the extent to which vari-
ous actors tried to shape the public debate before the
vote, I use discourse network analysis (DNA). The investi-
gation is complemented with further evidence from pri-
mary and secondary sources. The third step relates to an-
other level of analysis: For gauging the role that specific
arguments played in voters’ preference formation, data
from a post-vote survey are analysed bymeans of regres-
sion analysis.
4.2. Arguments and Actor Constellation
4.2.1. Method and Data
DNA helps to systematically assess the salience of argu-
ments in a discourse and actor constellations, such as
incumbents’ connections to political parties, over time
(Leifeld, 2017). The first step in DNA is the qualitative
or semiautomatic coding of statements in a text corpus.
Based on the resulting dataset, different types of net-
works that may help with uncovering the structure of
the underlying discourse can be generated. For example,
an affiliation network is a bipartite graph that captures
how actors refer to arguments either in an affirmative
or in a negative way. An affiliation network can be trans-
formed into an actor congruence network, i.e., an adja-
cency graph, in which actors are connected to other ac-
tors if they employ the same argument(s) in the text cor-
pus under analysis. An actor congruence network can be
useful for identifying coalitions of actors that share com-
mon understandings (Leifeld, 2016). Figure 1 illustrates
the basic model of a discourse network and contains fur-
ther explanations in the captions.
In Switzerland, more than 90 percent of the popu-
lation regularly read printed newspapers (WEMF, 2019),
and Swiss interest groups consider newspapers to be
more important for their communication activities than
other channels (Jentges, Brändli, Donges,& Jarren, 2013).
Newspaper articles are therefore a suitable data source
for an empirical examination of the theoretical expec-
tations developed in Section 3.1. The dataset used in
this study relies on content analysis of all newspaper
articles (excluding paid content and letters to the ed-
itor) that dealt substantially with the ballot proposi-
tion and were published between September 5 and
November 20, 2016, in 22 Swiss newspapers (Table 2
in the Supplementary File includes the list of newspa-
pers). This time frame corresponds to the core campaign-
ing period before the vote took place. The dataset com-
prises newspapers from the two major Swiss language
regions. It thereby covers all relevant quality newspa-
pers, as well as the newspapers with the highest circu-
lation in Switzerland (including free tabloids). This com-
prehensive newspaper sample includes a wide array of
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Figure 1. Basic model of a discourse network. Source: Author’s own depiction based on Leifeld (2016). Notes: Circles
symbolise actors and boxes symbolise arguments. The network in the middle represents an affiliation network. Here, the
presence of a line indicates that a certain actor (for example, a2) mentions the linked argument (e.g., c3). The number of
times an argument is mentioned in the discourse is captured by the argument’s indegree centrality (e.g., indegree = 2 for
c3). Likewise, the number of arguments an actor makes is captured by the actor’s outdegree centrality (e.g., outdegree= 1
for a3). The left network illustrates the corresponding actor congruence network. In this co-occurrence network, two ac-
tors are connected if they share at least one argument in the affiliation network (a1 and a2 both mention c1 and c2). The
more densely connected two actors are (depicted by line width), the more arguments they have in common. The network
on the right-hand side represents the corresponding concept congruence network, where two arguments are connected
if they are mentioned by the same actor (c4 and c5 are both mentioned by a5).
media with different ideological leanings, which is why
the ideological bias of any individual newspapers may
be only a minor issue. The dataset was compiled by the
Research Institute for the Public Sphere and Society at
the University of Zurich (see Udris, 2016), which since
2013 has compiled systematic datasets and analyses of
newspaper reporting before all federal referenda.
In total, the text corpus includes 395 newspaper ar-
ticles. The unit of analysis is the statement. Based on a
coding scheme (see Table 1 in the Supplementary File),
each statement made by individual or collective actors
was manually encoded according to six variables:
• The date of the statement;
• The newspaper in which the statement appeared;
• The name of the actor who made the statement;
• The actor’s organisational affiliation;
• The argument revealed in the statement; and
• Whether the actor approved or rejected the
argument.
4.2.2. Results
Overall, 20 different arguments were voiced by 269 ac-
tors. The distribution of observations is relatively bal-
anced, with 689 statements supportive of the initia-
tive and 751 statements rejecting the ballot proposition.
Table 3 in the Supplementary File details the six most fre-
quently used arguments.
As can be seen in Figure 2, both supporters and op-
ponents of the proposition used a broad range of argu-
ments. The most important argument voiced by the op-
ponents of the nuclear phase-out was the claim that the
phase-out plan, which provided for a gradual phase-out
by 2029, was too ‘hasty’ and would lead to ‘chaos’ (‘tim-
ing too hasty’; indegree: 104). Next, the phase-outwould
necessitate large-scale electricity imports, with most of
the electricity coming from Germany, a country in which
40 percent of the electricity mix was generated by coal-
fired power plants at the time (‘coal power import’; in-
degree: 97). This, according to opponents of the phase-
out, would increase the carbon footprint of the Swiss
electricity sector. Third, the pro-nuclear coalition argued
that phasing out nuclear power would be ‘too costly,’
especially as it would lead to an increase in consumer
prices (‘cost of phase-out’; indegree: 78). Fourth, claims
that retiring the nuclear reactors would endanger elec-
tricity supply, a key concern for many voters, also played
an important role in the campaign (‘endangered secu-
rity of supply’; indegree: 63). Arguments about cost and
security of supply can especially be interpreted as a di-
rect manifestation of incumbents’ structural power. The
four most frequently mentioned arguments against the
phase-out were also part of a large-scale print and on-
line advertising campaign. Figure 3 shows an example
of a poster that combines these four arguments in an
emotionally appealing way by conveying the threat of
supposedly imminent blackouts. The poster highlights
that the findings obtained via DNA with respect to the
prominence of specific arguments are not confined to
the sphere of newspaper reporting. Instead, they mirror
the broader communication patterns employed by the
pro-nuclear coalition.
The pro-phase-out coalition focused in particular on
the risks of nuclear power (Figure 2), which were men-
tioned frequently in the discourse (‘nuclear risk’; inde-
gree: 173). Moreover, these actors attempted to counter
the argument that a nuclear phase-out would impair
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Figure 2. Bar graph showing arguments used by supporters (green bars) and opponents (purple) of the nuclear phase-out.
Note: The size of the bars is proportional to the indegree centrality of the arguments. Filled bars indicate affirmative use
of an argument, and patterned bars indicate negative use. For example, the argument that nuclear power is risky (‘nuclear
risk’) was used in the affirmative sense by phase-out supporters and in the negative sense by opponents, while the argu-
ment that the phase-out would endanger security of electricity supply (‘endangered security of supply’) was used in the
affirmative sense by phase-out opponents and in the negative sense by supporters. Based on 1,440 statements conveyed
by 269 actors.
security of supply (‘endangered security of supply’; in-
degree: 120) and portrayed nuclear power as uneco-
nomic (‘nuclear = uneconomic’; indegree: 106). Other
arguments appeared considerably less frequently.
Figure 3. Anti-ballot-proposition poster. Translation: NO
to rash actions in nuclear phase-out, NO to chaotic im-
mediate shutdown, NO to reduced security of supply,
NO to foreign coal electricity, NO to Billions in costs.
No to the extreme nuclear phase-out initiative. Source:
Ausstiegsinitiative nein (2016).
Turning to the second expectation, Figure 4 illus-
trates the 15 collective actors who were most active in
the discourse prior to the popular vote. Among the op-
ponents of a nuclear phase-out, the party of the Federal
Councillor for Energy most actively campaigned against
the ballot proposition (Christian Democratic People’s
Party; outdegree: 138), ahead of the conservative lib-
eral FDP (outdegree: 77). The thirdmost active opponent
was the Axpo Group (outdegree: 50), a company that
partly or fully owns three of the four Swiss nuclear power
plants. Other actors that actively campaigned against
the phase-out included energy utilities Alpiq and BKW
Energie AG, the trade associations Economiesuisse and
the Swiss Trade Association SGV, the right-wing Swiss
People’s Party, and the Swiss transmission network oper-
ator, Swissgrid. On the side of phase-out advocates, the
Green Party (outdegree: 212) stands out as the most ac-
tive actor, way ahead of other actors such as the Social
Democratic Party (outdegree: 68) and the Green Liberal
Party (outdegree: 42).
To illustrate how incumbent energy businesses lined
up with political parties, Figure 5 depicts the actor con-
figuration based on an actor congruence network. Here,
two circles are linked if the actors which they represent
share at least one argument. Closely connected clusters
of circles represent coalitions of actors that share simi-
lar arguments. As can be inferred from the graph, there
was clear bipolarization between supporters of the bal-
lot proposition (represented by 119 actors on the left)
and opponents (108 actors on the right). The application
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Figure 4. Bar graphs showing the 15 most active collective actors (i.e., aggregated by organisation) supporting (green bars)
and rejecting (purple) the phase-out in the discourse. Note: The size of the bars is proportional to the actor’s outdegree
centrality. Based on 1,440 statements conveyed by 269 actors.
of the Girvan–Newman clustering algorithm, which de-
tects coalitions by removing edges with high between-
ness values, formally confirms the bipolar network struc-
ture (Girvan & Newman, 2002).
The coalition of opponents was dominated by the big
utilities (Axpo Group, Alpiq, BKW Energie AG) and sev-
eral interest groups representing incumbent actors (pur-
ple circles). Moreover, these actors were well connected
with the centre-right parties that opposed the proposal
(blue circles). While the graph is exclusively based on
shared arguments in the public discourse, the illustra-
tion mirrors Gava et al.’s (2017, p. 85) finding that Swiss
business groups representing key economic sectors such
as energy production have extensive interest affiliations
with the parties of the political right. Going beyond an
analysis of the newspaper discourse, it is known that in-
Figure 5. Actor congruence network. Note: Circles represent actors, links indicate shared arguments, and link width re-
flects the number of shared arguments used by connected actors. Purple circles represent actors from the nuclear utilities
(Axpo Group, Alpiq, BKW Energie AG) and their interest representations, blue circles represent politicians from the parties
opposing the initiative, green circles represent politicians from the parties supporting the initiative, and white circles rep-
resent other actors (e.g., municipal and cantonal authorities, scientists, etc.). All links adjacent to purple circles are also
purple. Based on 1,273 statements conveyed by 227 actors. Note that these numbers are smaller than those reported in
Section 4.2.2 as journalists were excluded from this network. Graph constructed with Visone 2.17 (circular layout).
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cumbent businesses and centre-right parties coordinate
their campaigning efforts through so-called nonpartisan
committees. These committees are typically formed in
the run-up to referenda and provide businesses and po-
litical parties with an opportunity to engage in mutu-
ally beneficial resource exchange (Emmenegger & Marx,
2019). By endorsing pro-nuclear arguments put forward
by energy businesses, the parties lent credibility to in-
cumbents’ claims with respect to the purported down-
sides of a nuclear phase-out, while businesses provided
campaign finance and expertise. In amplifying the ar-
guments of business, the centre-right parties ultimately
served to transmit business’s structural power in the pub-
lic arena.
4.3. Voting Behaviour
4.3.1. Method and Data
The third step of the analysis addresses whether the ar-
guments put forward in the political debate are related
to voting behaviour. As voting behaviour cannot be ob-
served directly in the case of federal referenda, the analy-
sis is based on a post-vote online survey fielded between
November 27 (voting day) and December 1, 2016, us-
ing a representative sample (n = 1,014) taken from the
German- and French-speaking parts of Switzerland (see
Rinscheid & Wüstenhagen, 2018, and Supplementary
File for more information on the survey). The focal de-
pendent variable is support for the ballot proposition.
Of the 896 respondents who confirmed their participa-
tion in the vote, ten did not remember their decision or
refused to answer the question about voting behaviour.
Of the remaining 886, 45.7 percent reported they had
accepted the proposition, whereas 54.3 percent indi-
cated rejection.
To assess the role of arguments, the survey included
six statements about nuclear phase-out and asked par-
ticipants to state their level of agreement (measured on
a five-point scale from ‘fully disagree’ to ‘fully agree’).
These statements correspond to the six arguments that
appeared most frequently in the public debate (see
Figure 2). Table 4 in the Supplementary File includes
the wording as used in the survey. Control variables in-
clude age, gender, education, partisan orientation (using
a dummy variable differentiating between parties sup-
porting and opposing the proposition), location of vot-
ers in terms of linguistic region and whether they were
living within a radius of 20 kilometres from a reactor,
and the number of cars in a respondent’s household as a
proxy for carbon footprint (Thalmann, 2004). Table 5 in
the Supplementary File includes descriptive statistics.
The survey data are analysed by means of regression
analysis. In order to take voting-related self-selection
into account, the analysis of the determinants of voting
behaviour relies on a Heckman selection strategy (see
also Carattini, Baranzini, Thalmann, Varone, & Vöhringer,
2017). This procedure involves two steps, both based
on regression analysis. First, the selection model mod-
els the process by which survey participants decided to
participate in/abstain from the ballot; second, the out-
come model models support for the ballot proposition
as a function of both the independent variables and the
estimates of step one (Johnston, 2013). In other words,
the procedure jointly estimates the probability of partic-
ipating in the vote (step one) and casting either a ‘yes’-
or a ‘no’-vote (step two). As both outcomes are binary, I
used a probit model.
4.3.2. Results
Table 1 contains the model estimates. The column la-
belled ‘SelectionModel 1’ presents the estimates for par-
ticipation in the popular vote (i.e., step 1). Accordingly,
young age (below 35) and a higher number of cars
in a household are negatively related to participation.
The endorsement of arguments put forward in the pub-
lic debate, on the other hand, is not systematically re-
lated to turnout rates. Moreover, as an extended model
contained in the Supplementary File (Table 6, Selection
Model 2) shows, there is no partisan effect, which indi-
cates that mobilization was not skewed in favour of one
of the political camps. Given that the model covers only
82 non-voters, care should be taken when interpreting
these findings.
Next, I turn to explaining support for the nuclear
phase-out initiative as expressed through voting be-
haviour (i.e., step 2). According to Outcome Model 1, all
six arguments introduced earlier are significant predic-
tors of vote choice. Adding partisan orientation does not
affect this finding, and partisan orientation is not signifi-
cantly related to vote choice (see Outcome Model 2 of
Table 6 in the Supplementary File). An additional anal-
ysis based on a series of ordered-probit models shows
that partisan orientation is, at least partly, associated
with approval of arguments. Hence, while there is no di-
rect effect of partisan orientation, its impact on voting
behaviour appears to be mediated by voters’ approval
of specific arguments. However, while voters who lean
towards centre-right parties systematically endorse in-
cumbents’ arguments against nuclear phase-out, there
is not much evidence for an effect of a partisan heuris-
tic among left-wing party supporters (see Table 7 in the
Supplementary File). Further factors that are correlated
with voting behaviour include age, place of residence in
terms of geographical proximity to a nuclear power plant,
and education. While the effect for voters younger than
35 is positive, higher education and residence within the
danger zone are negatively related to support for the bal-
lot proposition.
5. Discussion
As outlined in Section 1, the ambition of this article is
to explain the outcome of the 2016 nuclear phase-out
referendum in Switzerland. By systematically assessing
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Table 1. Heckman-selection probit model explaining support for the ballot proposition.
Outcome Model 1 Selection Model 1
(1 = Support for nuclear phase-out initiative) (1 = Participation in the vote)
Variable Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Arguments against phase-out
Endangered security of supply −.477** .093 .078 .067
Coal power import −.313** .101 .069 .073
Timing too hasty −.524** .093 .009 .068
Cost of phase-out −.437** .088 −.067 .069
Arguments in favour of phase-out
Nuclear risk .237* .085 .031 .062
Nuclear = Uneconomic .370* .105 .065 .064
Controls
Cars −.137 .112 −.134* .066
Young .707** .251 −.316* .154
Elderly .149 .226 .282 .158
Female .156 .189 −.158 .125
Residence within Danger Zone −.615* .295 −.163 .159
French-speaking −.358 .219 .085 .166
Higher Education −.436* .212 .271 .142
Intercept 3.490** .778 .918 .521
N (censored/uncensored) 825 (82/743)
Notes: Entries are Heckman probit coefficients and standard errors (SE). *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
the arguments employed in the political discourse and
the actor constellation prior to the public vote, and by
using this assessment to inform an analysis of voting be-
haviour, the study links behaviouralist and interest group
perspectives. It thereby offers an explanation for the ob-
servation that voters’ perceptions of nuclear powerwere
significantly altered in the run-up to the popular vote,
as documented by Rinscheid and Wüstenhagen (2018).
Going beyond the latter contribution, which was exclu-
sively based on survey evidence, this article is interested
in illuminating the role of societal actors that try to shape
citizens’ preferences. More generally, it contributes to a
broader discussion about the structural power of busi-
ness and its influence on preference formation.
The Swiss popular initiative to phase out nuclear
power entailed major consequences for only a small
number of firms, but the latter occupy crucial positions
in the economy. Although a majority of voters initially
endorsed the popular initiative, the proposal was finally
rejected. The analysis suggests that structurally power-
ful incumbents were able to raise concerns that had
a direct bearing on voters’ choices. These arguments,
which were amplified by centre-right parties, can be in-
terpreted as a reflection of the structural position of
incumbents in the economy. The analysis underscores
Emmenegger and Marx’s (2019) argument that party
elites, at least in Switzerland, are often part of economic
elites, so that the two are almost indistinguishable. The
findings also mirror Stirling’s (2014) analysis of power
and knowledge in nuclear energy politics. Accordingly,
the ways by which “incumbent interests configure ‘sci-
entific’ knowledges such as to condition wider social ex-
pectations over what is ‘realistic’ or ‘unrealistic’ as direc-
tions for technological change” are considered a pivotal
lever for influencing energy policies (Stirling, 2014, p. 86).
The findings can also be related to recent research in the
organizational literature, in which companies’ strategy
of influencing voters by expressing concern about the
common good has been dubbed ‘corporate citizenspeak’
(Nyberg & Murray, 2017).
It is important to note that the popular initiative was
part of a broader process of reconfiguring Swiss energy
policy. In 2011, the government launched a comprehen-
sive policy package aimed at transforming the Swiss en-
ergy system. The Energy Strategy 2050 was adopted by
parliament in September 2016 and obtained a popular
majority in May 2017. According to the Energy Strategy
2050, nuclear power plants may be operated as long
as they are considered ‘safe’ (while prohibiting the con-
struction of new ones)—in contrast, the phase-out initia-
tive followed a different logic by including specific retire-
ment dates. Could the erosion of citizens’ preferences for
nuclear phase-out be simply due to a learning effect; i.e.,
the fact that voters became aware of the alternative pro-
posal to prevent nuclear newbuild included in the Energy
Strategy 2050 during the campaign in autumn 2016? The
data suggest that this is unlikely, as the Energy Strategy
2050 did not play a prominent role in the discussions
about nuclear phase-out in 2016 (see Figure 2, argument
‘Energy Strategy 2050’). Why did energy incumbents
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manage to induce a collective preference shift in the
context of nuclear phase-out, but not in the case of the
Energy Strategy? The comparison points to business po-
larisation as an important moderating factor of business
influence: Whereas incumbents and centre-right parties
were united in their fight against nuclear phase-out,
only some smaller pro-nuclear interest groups, sectoral
associations, and the Swiss People’s Party campaigned
against the Energy Strategy 2050. Meanwhile, energy in-
cumbents like Axpo Group and Alpiq, the Association of
Electricity Companies, and some of the parties that were
against the phase-out initiative supported the compre-
hensive Energy Strategy 2050.
The study responds to calls to devote more atten-
tion to the political dynamics of energy transformations
(Stokes & Breetz, 2018) and contributes to the emerging
debate about the deliberate destabilization of unsustain-
able energy systems (Kivimaa& Kern, 2016; Rosenbloom,
2018). The study’s implications are not unique to the
energy sector, though. Similar mechanisms have been
shown to operate in the field of the politics of taxation,
where business’s structural power can explain voters’ op-
position to higher taxes on the super-rich (Emmenegger
& Marx, 2019). The analysis demonstrates that busi-
ness’s structural power requires agency to become man-
ifest in noisy politics. Without transmission through dis-
cursive channels (i.e., campaigns that use trustworthy ac-
tors to make incumbents’ arguments heard), structural
power will remain ineffective.
Methodologically, one of the study’s objectives was
to demonstrate how the DNA method can be used to in-
form an analysis of survey data. Specifically, the connec-
tion of DNA and survey data analysis shows promise in
terms of fostering understanding of how business power
and arguments voiced in political debates influence citi-
zens’ preferences. Of course, the study also has some lim-
itations. Most importantly, perhaps, the research design
does not permit the direct testing of causal links. While
the correlational evidence suggests that voters affiliated
with centre-right parties considered business arguments
to be credible and hence rejected the ballot proposi-
tion, experimental or panel data would be needed to
provide conclusive evidence of the hypothesized mech-
anisms. Future work should expand this line of inquiry
and try to overcome the methodological limitations of
this study, for example, by combining DNA with experi-
mental methods or linkage analysis to demonstrate the
causal influence of the power of business with regard to
citizens’ preferences.
In addition, single-case studies raise issues of exter-
nal validity. Switzerland represents an idiosyncratic insti-
tutional structure, as no other country calls its citizens
to the ballot as frequently. Nevertheless, the findings
suggest broader implications. First, as Emmenegger and
Marx (2019, p. 116) note, apart from direct democratic
votes, “ordinary elections provide similar and additional
opportunities” to influence the preference formation of
voters. Second, direct democratic provisions are increas-
ingly being extended in many parts of the world. As this
study suggests, direct democracy provides no guarantee
that structural power will shrink in significance. Even if
business’s structural power becomes less pronounced
in the traditional sense of agenda control, it may be-
come relevant as a resource that can be strategically ex-
ploited to influence voters.Moreover, while direct demo-
cratic campaigns are an ideal laboratory for studying
noisy politics, business’s structural power can also push
public preferences in desired directions in the absence
of voting, as the business campaign against Australia’s
Minerals Resource Rent Tax in 2010 demonstrates (Bell
& Hindmoor, 2014).
The question whether organised interests are able
to influence voters is related to the fundamental power
relations in societies; notably, what Lukes (2005) in-
troduces as the ‘third face’ of power. In emphasising
ideational elements, this dimension of power directs at-
tention to the possibility that some societal actors might
be able to shape others’ “perceptions, cognitions, and
preferences in such a way that they accept their role in
the existing order of things” (Lukes, 2005, p. 28). In some
economic sectors, entire societies are structurally depen-
dent on a small number of businesses, of which the en-
ergy field is an example. This study suggests that the
structural position of such businessesmight enable them
to inculcate beliefs in others that further their own in-
terests, but which are not necessarily to society’s advan-
tage (Pierson, 2016, p. 127). While Pierson rightly notes
the methodological challenges of the related research
agenda, the fact that the notion of power is absent from
most studies that assess voters’ preferences about public
policies should not be used to commend a “shift…from a
focus on individual behavior to one of strategic interac-
tion among elites” (Pierson, 2016, p. 137). Instead, I con-
tend that it would be more productive to connect both
perspectives and to empirically assess how power rela-
tions play out in the individual-level process of prefer-
ence construction. Future research may combine DNA
with experimental methods or panel data tomore clearly
demonstrate the causal influence of the structural power
of business.
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